Cycle Cancellation for Submodular Fractional Allocations and Applications
Chandra Chekuri, Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Jan Vondrak

TL;DR
This paper extends cycle cancellation techniques to submodular valuations in allocation problems, leading to new approximation algorithms for max-min, Nash social welfare, and maximin-share objectives.
Contribution
It proves a cycle-canceling lemma for submodular valuations and applies it to develop improved algorithms for key allocation problems.
Findings
Achieves a 1/5-approximation for submodular Nash social welfare.
Provides a 0.5(1-1/e)-approximation for the maximin-share problem.
Develops tight or best-known approximation algorithms for special cases.
Abstract
We consider discrete allocation problem where indivisible goods are to be divided among agents. When agents' valuations are additive, the well-known cycle cancelling lemma by Lenstra, Shmoys, and Tardos plays a key role in design and analysis of rounding algorithms. In this paper, we prove an analogous lemma for the case of submodular valuations. Our algorithm removes cycles in the support graph of a fractional allocation while guaranteeing that each agent's value, measured using the multilinear extension, does not decrease. We demonstrate applications of the cycle-canceling algorithm, along with other ideas, to obtain new algorithms and results for three well-studied allocation objectives: max-min (Santa Claus problem), Nash social welfare (NSW), and maximin-share (MMS). For the submodular NSW problem, we obtain a -approximation; for the MMS problem, we obtain…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
