
TL;DR
This paper introduces a model of identification design for robust causal inference, analyzing how information structures influence manipulability and identification in microeconometric environments.
Contribution
It develops a theoretical framework for understanding manipulability and provides conditions for exact identification and payoff bounds based on information disclosure.
Findings
All treatment-effects models are manipulable.
Manipulation is feasible with almost fully informative structures.
Rich covariate disclosure can eliminate manipulation in experiments.
Abstract
This paper develops a model of \textit{identification design} and applies it to robust causal inference in microeconometrics. The decision maker observes the population distribution of signals generated by an information structure and ranks actions by their worst-case payoff over the set of admissible state distributions consistent with those signals. We call an environment \textit{manipulable} if every action is implementable under all true distributions of the state variable, and show this holds if and only if all actions share the same worst-case payoff. We confirm in application that all treatment-effects models are manipulable, and moreover that manipulation is feasible via \textit{almost fully informative} information structures that conceal at most one dimension of information from the decision maker. As in practice, we consider a restriction to \textit{marginal information…
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