Iterative Negotiation and Oversight: A Case Study in Decentralized Air Traffic Management
Jaehan Im, John-Paul Clarke, Ufuk Topcu, David Fridovich-Keil

TL;DR
This paper introduces an iterative negotiation framework with oversight for decentralized multi-agent systems, ensuring system efficiency and fairness with formal guarantees, demonstrated through air traffic management case studies.
Contribution
It presents a novel oversight mechanism that guides decentralized negotiations towards efficient and equitable outcomes with proven finite-time convergence guarantees.
Findings
Framework achieves reliable consensus among noncooperative agents.
Oversight mechanism balances system efficiency and convergence speed.
Case study confirms practical applicability in air traffic management.
Abstract
Achieving consensus among noncooperative agents remains challenging in decentralized multi-agent systems, where agents often have conflicting preferences. Existing coordination methods enable agents to reach consensus without a centralized coordinator, but do not provide formal guarantees on system-level objectives such as efficiency or fairness. To address this limitation, we propose an iterative negotiation and oversight framework that augments a decentralized negotiation mechanism with taxation-like oversight. The framework builds upon the trading auction for consensus, enabling noncooperative agents with conflicting preferences to negotiate through asset trading while preserving valuation privacy. We introduce an oversight mechanism, which implements a taxation-like intervention that guides decentralized negotiation toward system-efficient and equitable outcomes while also…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAir Traffic Management and Optimization · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications
