From Competition to Coordination: Market Making as a Scalable Framework for Safe and Aligned Multi-Agent LLM Systems
Brendan Gho, Suman Muppavarapu, Afnan Shaik, Tyson Tsay, Atharva Mohan, James Begin, Kevin Zhu, Archana Vaidheeswaran, Vasu Sharma

TL;DR
This paper proposes a market-making framework for multi-agent LLM systems that aligns incentives through economic exchanges, improving accuracy, transparency, and robustness in collective reasoning tasks.
Contribution
It introduces a scalable, market-based coordination method for multi-agent LLMs that enhances trustworthiness and verifiability without external enforcement.
Findings
Up to 10% accuracy improvement over baselines
Enhanced interpretability of reasoning steps
Operationalizes accountability and robustness
Abstract
As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as centralized oversight or adversarial adjudication, struggle to scale and often obscure how decisions emerge. We introduce a market-making framework for multi-agent large language model (LLM) coordination that organizes agent interactions as structured economic exchanges. In this setup, each agent acts as a market participant, updating and trading probabilistic beliefs, to converge toward shared, truthful outcomes. By aligning local incentives with collective epistemic goals, the framework promotes self-organizing, verifiable reasoning without requiring external enforcement. Empirically, we evaluate this approach across factual reasoning, ethical…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
