An Agent-Based Simulation of Regularity-Driven Student Attrition: How Institutional Time-to-Live Constraints Create a Dropout Trap in Higher Education

TL;DR

This study uses an agent-based model to show that institutional time constraints significantly contribute to student dropout rates in engineering education, beyond academic failure.

Contribution

It introduces a calibrated agent-based simulation incorporating empirical data and psycho-academic archetypes to analyze the impact of normative friction on attrition.

Findings

86.4% of dropouts driven by normative mechanisms

Dropout vulnerability varies significantly across archetypes

Rigid assessment timelines disproportionately affect students with lower self-regulatory skills

Abstract

High dropout rates in engineering programmes are conventionally attributed to student deficits: lack of academic preparation or motivation. However, this view neglects the causal role of "normative friction": the complex system of administrative rules, exam validity windows, and prerequisite chains that constrain student progression. This paper introduces "The Regularity Trap," a phenomenon where rigid assessment timelines decouple learning from accreditation. We operationalize the CAPIRE framework into a calibrated Agent-Based Model (ABM) simulating 1,343 student trajectories across a 42-course Civil Engineering curriculum. The model integrates empirical course parameters and thirteen psycho-academic archetypes derived from a 15-year longitudinal dataset. By formalizing the "Regularity Regime" as a decaying validity function, we isolate the effect of administrative time limits on attrition. Results reveal that 86.4% of observed dropouts are driven by normative mechanisms (expiry cascades) rather than purely academic failure (5.3%). While the overall dropout rate stabilized at 32.4%, vulnerability was highly heterogeneous: archetypes with myopic planning horizons faced attrition rates up to 49.0%, compared to 13.2% for strategic agents, despite comparable academic ability. These findings challenge the neutrality of administrative structures, suggesting that rigid validity windows act as an invisible filter that disproportionately penalizes students with lower self-regulatory capital.