The Subtle Art of Defection: Understanding Uncooperative Behaviors in LLM based Multi-Agent Systems
Devang Kulshreshtha, Wanyu Du, Raghav Jain, Srikanth Doss, Hang Su, Sandesh Swamy, Yanjun Qi

TL;DR
This paper presents a framework for simulating and analyzing uncooperative behaviors in LLM-based multi-agent systems, revealing their potential to cause rapid system collapse and evaluating detection methods.
Contribution
It introduces a game theory-based taxonomy and a multi-stage simulation pipeline for uncooperative behaviors in multi-agent systems, filling a key research gap.
Findings
Uncooperative behaviors can cause system collapse within 1-7 rounds.
LLM-based detection methods detect some behaviors but miss others.
Cooperative agents maintain perfect stability, uncooperative ones cause rapid failure.
Abstract
This paper introduces a novel framework for simulating and analyzing how uncooperative behaviors can destabilize or collapse LLM-based multi-agent systems. Our framework includes two key components: (1) a game theory-based taxonomy of uncooperative agent behaviors, addressing a notable gap in the existing literature; and (2) a structured, multi-stage simulation pipeline that dynamically generates and refines uncooperative behaviors as agents' states evolve. We evaluate the framework via a collaborative resource management setting, measuring system stability using metrics such as survival time and resource overuse rate. Empirically, our framework achieves 96.7% accuracy in generating realistic uncooperative behaviors, validated by human evaluations. Our results reveal a striking contrast: cooperative agents maintain perfect system stability (100% survival over 12 rounds with 0% resource…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSimulation Techniques and Applications · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
