The Publication Choice Problem

TL;DR

This paper models researchers' publication venue choices using game theory to understand how individual decisions influence and are influenced by venue impact factors, revealing complex strategic interactions.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for publication choices, proves the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and analyzes the effects of venue labeling on impact factors.

Findings

Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in publication choices

Impact of 'spotlight' labeling varies with venue competitiveness

Labeling top papers can decrease overall venue impact

Abstract

Researchers strategically choose where to submit their work in order to maximize its impact, and these publication decisions in turn determine venues' impact factors. To analyze how individual publication choices both respond to and shape venue impact, we introduce a game-theoretic framework, coined the Publication Choice Problem, that captures this two-way interplay. We show the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the Publication Choice Problem and its uniqueness under binary researcher types. Our characterizations of the equilibrium properties offer insights about what publication behaviors better indicate a researcher's impact level. Through equilibrium analysis, we further investigate how labeling papers with ``spotlight'' affects the impact factor of venues in the research community. Our analysis shows that competitive venue labeling top papers with ``spotlight'' may decrease the overall impact of other venues in the community, while less competitive venues with ``spotlight'' labeling have the opposite impact.