ProxyPrints: From Database Breach to Spoof, A Plug-and-Play Defense for Biometric Systems
Yaniv Hacmon, Keren Gorelik, Gilad Gressel, Yisroel Mirsky

TL;DR
ProxyPrints introduces a middleware layer for fingerprint systems that enhances security by enabling revocable, unlinkable aliases, preventing spoofing attacks without compromising recognition accuracy.
Contribution
It is the first practical middleware solution that adds cancellable biometrics to existing fingerprint systems without modifying proprietary matching software.
Findings
Preserves matching accuracy on benchmark datasets
Provides strong security and revocability against spoofing
Enables breach detection through alias monitoring
Abstract
Fingerprint recognition systems are widely deployed for authentication and forensic applications, but the security of stored fingerprint data remains a critical vulnerability. While many systems avoid storing raw fingerprint images in favor of minutiae-based templates, recent research shows that these templates can be reverse-engineered to reconstruct realistic fingerprint images, enabling physical spoofing attacks that compromise user identities with no means of remediation. We present ProxyPrints, the first practical defense that brings cancellable biometrics to existing fingerprint recognition systems without requiring modifications to proprietary matching software. ProxyPrints acts as a transparent middleware layer between the fingerprint scanner and the matching algorithm, transforming each scanned fingerprint into a consistent, unlinkable alias. This transformation allows…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBiometric Identification and Security · User Authentication and Security Systems · Forensic Fingerprint Detection Methods
