Generalized Friendship Paradoxes in Network Science
Desmond J. Higham, Francesco Hrobat, Francesco Tudisco

TL;DR
This paper explores generalized friendship paradoxes in network science, providing new theoretical insights into when these paradoxes occur for various centrality measures and attributes, including global and local perspectives.
Contribution
It introduces novel theoretical results on the inevitability of friendship paradoxes using linear algebra, covering multiple centrality measures and attributes, and highlights open questions.
Findings
Friendship paradoxes hold for many walk-based centralities like Katz and total subgraph communicability.
Counterexamples exist for even-length walk-based centralities.
The paradox always holds in reverse for loneliness as an attribute.
Abstract
Generalized friendship paradoxes occur when, on average, our friends have more of some attribute than us. These paradoxes are relevant to many aspects of human interaction, notably in social science and epidemiology. Here, we derive new theoretical results concerning the inevitability of a paradox arising, using a linear algebra perspective. Following the seminal 1991 work of Scott L. Feld, we consider two distinct ways to measure and compare averages, which may be regarded as global and local. For global averaging, we show that a generalized friendship paradox holds for a large family of walk-based centralities, including Katz centrality and total subgraph communicability, and also for nonbacktracking eigenvector centrality. However, we also find counterexamples for centralities based on walks of even length. For local averaging we establish a paradox for nonbacktracking eigenvector…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
