Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation
Siyu He, Qin Li, Minyu Feng, Attila Szolnoki

TL;DR
This paper introduces an assimilated reputation mechanism in a spatial public goods game, demonstrating how it promotes cooperation by integrating individual and community reputation, and leveraging social learning and adaptive group advantages.
Contribution
It presents a novel reputation assimilation approach that considers community influence and group quality, extending previous models of reputation in cooperation dynamics.
Findings
Reputation assimilation enhances cooperation levels.
High-reputation groups gain payoff advantages.
The mechanism sustains cooperation at a systemic level.
Abstract
Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but may also reflect the general state of a local community. Consequently, a person with a high reputation becomes attractive not just because we can expect cooperative acts with higher probability, but also because such a person is involved in a more efficient group venture. These observations highlight the cumulative and socially transmissible nature of reputation. Interestingly, these aspects were completely ignored by previous works. To reveal the possible consequences, we introduce a spatial public goods game in which we use an assimilated reputation simultaneously characterizing the individual and its neighbors' reputation. Furthermore, a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Game Theory and Applications
