On Multi-Level Apportionment
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Steven Wijaya

TL;DR
This paper introduces a hierarchical extension of apportionment methods, demonstrating how different classical methods satisfy quota principles at multiple levels and can be combined to meet both upper and lower quota constraints.
Contribution
It generalizes apportionment to hierarchical group structures and proves that classical methods can be adapted to satisfy quota conditions at each level.
Findings
Adams' method level-by-level satisfies upper quota.
Jefferson's and quota methods satisfy lower quota.
Both quota notions can be simultaneously fulfilled.
Abstract
Apportionment refers to the well-studied problem of allocating legislative seats among parties or groups with different entitlements. We present a multi-level generalization of apportionment where the groups form a hierarchical structure, which gives rise to stronger versions of the upper and lower quota notions. We show that running Adams' method level-by-level satisfies upper quota, while running Jefferson's method or the quota method level-by-level guarantees lower quota. Moreover, we prove that both quota notions can always be fulfilled simultaneously.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Gender Politics and Representation
