Understanding the Impact of Proportionality in Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections
Niclas Boehmer, Lara Glessen, Jannik Peters

TL;DR
This paper investigates how proportionality axioms influence committee selection in approval-based multiwinner elections through computational analysis and experiments, revealing significant variability and introducing new importance measures.
Contribution
It provides the first comprehensive analysis of the practical impact of proportionality axioms and introduces novel measures for candidate importance beyond approval scores.
Findings
High variability in proportionality restrictiveness across instances
Unobserved high restrictiveness in some real-world elections
New measures for candidate importance that differ from approval scores
Abstract
Despite extensive theoretical research on proportionality in approval-based multiwinner voting, its impact on which committees and candidates can be selected in practice remains poorly understood. We address this gap by (i) analyzing the computational complexity of several natural problems related to the behavior of proportionality axioms, and (ii) conducting an extensive experimental study on both real-world and synthetic elections. Our findings reveal substantial variation in the restrictiveness of proportionality across instances, including previously unobserved high levels of restrictiveness in some real-world cases. We also introduce and evaluate new measures for quantifying a candidate's importance for achieving proportional outcomes, which differ clearly from assessing candidate strength by approval score.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
