Quantum Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Key-Length Extension Constructions
Min Liang, Ruihao Gao, Jiali Wu

TL;DR
This paper introduces quantum meet-in-the-middle attacks on key-length extension block cipher constructions, demonstrating how quantum algorithms can significantly reduce attack complexity and threaten the security of these schemes.
Contribution
It presents novel quantum MITM and SITM attacks on specific KLE constructions, extending quantum cryptanalysis techniques to broader cipher architectures.
Findings
Quantum MITM attacks reduce security of 2kTE under Q2 model.
Quantum MITM attack on 3XCE achieves quadratic speedup over classical methods.
Extended quantum SITM framework applicable to various cipher constructions.
Abstract
Key-length extension (KLE) techniques provide a general approach to enhancing the security of block ciphers by using longer keys. There are mainly two classes of KLE techniques, cascade encryption and XOR-cascade encryption. This paper presents several quantum meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against two specific KLE constructions. For the two-key triple encryption (2kTE), we propose two quantum MITM attacks under the Q2 model. The first attack, leveraging the quantum claw-finding (QCF) algorithm, achieves a time complexity of with quantum random access memory (QRAM). The second attack, based on Grover's algorithm, achieves a time complexity of with QRAM. The latter complexity is nearly identical to Grover-based brute-force attack on the underlying block cipher, indicating that 2kTE does not enhance security under…
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture · Quantum Information and Cryptography · Coding theory and cryptography
