Fair Multi-agent Persuasion with Submodular Constraints
Yannan Bai, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen, Davidson Zhu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a signaling policy for Bayesian persuasion in multi-agent settings with submodular constraints, achieving near-optimal fairness in utility distribution among agents.
Contribution
It presents a novel approach to fairness in multi-agent persuasion, using majorization and polymatroid structures, with an efficient approximation algorithm.
Findings
Achieves logarithmic approximation to fair utility distribution
Structural characterization of agent utilities as base polytopes
Polynomial-time approximation via multiplicative weights update
Abstract
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with knowledge of the agents' values seeks to influence the outcome of the selection by designing informative signals and providing tie-breaking policies, so that when the receiver maximizes welfare over the resulting posteriors, the expected utilities of the agents (where utility is defined as allocation times value) achieve certain fairness properties. The fairness measure we will use is majorization, which simultaneously approximately maximizes all symmetric, monotone, concave functions of the utilities. We consider the general setting where the allocation to the agents needs to respect arbitrary submodular constraints, as given by the corresponding…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications
