Fair Division with Indivisible Goods, Chores, and Cake
Haris Aziz, Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

TL;DR
This paper investigates fair division of indivisible goods, chores, and divisible cake among agents with additive utilities, proving that an envy-free allocation always exists under these conditions.
Contribution
It introduces the concept of envy-freeness for mixed resources (EFM) and proves the existence of EFM allocations with indivisible items and a cake for any number of agents.
Findings
EFM allocations always exist with indivisible items and a cake.
The paper formalizes envy-freeness for mixed resources.
It extends fair division theory to include chores and divisible goods.
Abstract
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to some agents and a chore that yields negative utilities to the other agents. Given a fixed set of divisible and indivisible resources, we investigate almost envy-free allocations, captured by the natural fairness concept of envy-freeness for mixed resources (EFM). It requires that an agent does not envy another agent if agent 's bundle contains any piece of cake yielding positive utility to agent (i.e., envy-freeness), and agent is envy-free up to one item (EF1) towards agent otherwise. We prove that with indivisible items and a cake, an EFM allocation always exists for any number of agents with additive utilities.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications
