Agentmandering: A Game-Theoretic Framework for Fair Redistricting via Large Language Model Agents
Hao Li, Haotian Chen, Ruoyuan Gong, Juanjuan Wang, Hao Jiang

TL;DR
Agentmandering introduces a game-theoretic framework using large language model agents to create fairer, less biased redistricting plans by simulating strategic negotiation between political interests.
Contribution
This work pioneers integrating game theory and large language models into redistricting, enabling strategic, interpretable, and fair districting processes that outperform traditional methods.
Findings
Reduces partisan bias and unfairness significantly.
Achieves 2 to 3 orders of magnitude lower variance than baselines.
Enhances fairness and stability in swing-state scenarios.
Abstract
Redistricting plays a central role in shaping how votes are translated into political power. While existing computational methods primarily aim to generate large ensembles of legally valid districting plans, they often neglect the strategic dynamics involved in the selection process. This oversight creates opportunities for partisan actors to cherry-pick maps that, while technically compliant, are politically advantageous. Simply satisfying formal constraints does not ensure fairness when the selection process itself can be manipulated. We propose \textbf{Agentmandering}, a framework that reimagines redistricting as a turn-based negotiation between two agents representing opposing political interests. Drawing inspiration from game-theoretic ideas, particularly the \textit{Choose-and-Freeze} protocol, our method embeds strategic interaction into the redistricting process via large…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Human Mobility and Location-Based Analysis
