Computational Foundations for Strategic Coopetition: Formalizing Trust and Reputation Dynamics
Vik Pant, Eric Yu

TL;DR
This paper develops a computational trust model for strategic coopetition, integrating game-theoretic foundations with conceptual trust relationships, validated through extensive experiments and a real-world case study.
Contribution
It introduces a structured translation framework from conceptual models to computational trust, capturing dynamic trust evolution in multi-stakeholder coopetitive systems.
Findings
Trust evolves asymmetrically with cooperation and violations.
Hysteresis effects influence trust recovery and ceilings.
Empirical validation aligns with documented trust dynamics.
Abstract
Modern socio-technical systems increasingly involve multi-stakeholder environments where actors simultaneously cooperate and compete. These coopetitive relationships exhibit dynamic trust evolution based on observed behavior over repeated interactions. While conceptual modeling languages like i* represent trust relationships qualitatively, they lack computational mechanisms for analyzing how trust changes with behavioral evidence. Conversely, computational trust models from multi-agent systems provide algorithmic updating but lack grounding in conceptual models that capture strategic dependencies covering mixed motives of actors. This technical report bridges this gap by developing a computational trust model that extends game-theoretic foundations for strategic coopetition with dynamic trust evolution. Building on companion work that achieved 58/60 validation (96.7%) for logarithmic…
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