Strategic Task Offloading for Delay-Sensitive IoT Applications: A Game-Theory-Based Demand-Supply Mechanism with Participation Incentives
Azadeh Pourkabirian, Amir Masoud Rahmani, Kai Li, and Wei Ni

TL;DR
This paper proposes a game-theoretic demand-supply model with incentives for task offloading in delay-sensitive IoT applications, ensuring efficient resource allocation and latency guarantees in edge computing environments.
Contribution
It introduces a novel economic demand-supply model combined with a VCG auction framework for effective task offloading in IoT, addressing market balance and incentive issues.
Findings
Maximizes social welfare in task offloading
Ensures truthfulness and market balance
Provides latency guarantees for IoT applications
Abstract
Delay-sensitive Internet of Things (IoT) applications have drawn significant attention. Running many of these applications on IoT devices is challenging due to the limited processing resources of these devices and the need for real-time responses. Task offloading can minimize latency by transferring computationally intensive tasks from IoT devices to resource-rich edge servers, ensuring delay and performance guarantees. In this paper, we develop a task-offloading approach for delay-sensitive IoT applications in edge computing environments. Unlike existing schemes, we model the task offloading problem as an economic demand and supply model to achieve market balance. The proposed model avoids under- and over-supply, ensuring the computational resources at edge servers (supply) are allocated in a manner that best meets the processing and computational needs of user devices (demand). Given…
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