Mind, Matter, and Freedom in Quantum Mechanics and the de Broglie-Bohm Theory
Valia Allori (Universit\`a degli Studi di Bergamo, via Pignolo 123, 24121 Bergamo, Italy, and Jean Bricmont IRMP, UCLouvain, chemin du Cyclotron 2, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve Belgium)

TL;DR
This paper argues that the de Broglie-Bohm theory can address key philosophical issues in quantum mechanics without endorsing determinism, free will, consciousness, idealism, or reductionism, challenging common interpretations.
Contribution
It demonstrates that the de Broglie-Bohm theory provides a coherent account of quantum phenomena without supporting controversial philosophical claims.
Findings
De Broglie-Bohm theory explains quantum phenomena without endorsing determinism.
The theory offers a perspective that avoids the need for consciousness or idealism.
It challenges the view that quantum mechanics refutes realism or reductionism.
Abstract
There are several important philosophical problems to which quantum mechanics is often said to have made significant contributions: - Determinism: quantum theory has been taken to refute determinism; -Free Will: in turn, this is thought to open the door to free will; - The mind-body problem: relatedly, it is sometimes said to shed light on consciousness; - Idealism: more radically, quantum theory is assumed to have refuted realism and to have placed the observer at the center of the world; - Reductionism: even granting realism, it has been claimed that quantum theory undermines reductionism. Our main thesis in this paper is that none of this is either necessary or desirable. By adopting the de Broglie--Bohm theory (or Bohmian mechanics), one can straightforwardly account for quantum phenomena without endorsing any of these claims.
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