Scalable Neural Incentive Design with Parameterized Mean-Field Approximation
Nathan Corecco, Batuhan Yardim, Vinzenz Thoma, Zebang Shen, Niao He

TL;DR
This paper introduces a scalable incentive design method for large multi-agent systems using parameterized mean-field approximation, providing theoretical guarantees and an efficient algorithm that improves revenue in auction settings.
Contribution
It formalizes incentive design as a parameterized mean-field game and develops the AMID algorithm with provable approximation bounds for large agent populations.
Findings
AMID algorithm effectively increases revenue in auction settings.
Theoretical approximation bounds hold even with discontinuous dynamics.
Scalable incentive design is feasible for large multi-agent systems.
Abstract
Designing incentives for a multi-agent system to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium is both a crucial and challenging problem appearing in many decision-making domains, especially for a large number of agents . Under the exchangeability assumption, we formalize this incentive design (ID) problem as a parameterized mean-field game (PMFG), aiming to reduce complexity via an infinite-population limit. We first show that when dynamics and rewards are Lipschitz, the finite- ID objective is approximated by the PMFG at rate . Moreover, beyond the Lipschitz-continuous setting, we prove the same decay for the important special case of sequential auctions, despite discontinuities in dynamics, through a tailored auction-specific analysis. Built on our novel approximation results, we further introduce our Adjoint Mean-Field…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Reinforcement Learning in Robotics · Stochastic Gradient Optimization Techniques
