Instance-Adaptive Hypothesis Tests with Heterogeneous Agents
Flora C. Shi, Martin J. Wainwright, Stephen Bates

TL;DR
This paper introduces a method for designing adaptive hypothesis tests for heterogeneous strategic agents, enabling near-oracle performance by eliciting private information through tailored menus of statistical contracts.
Contribution
It develops a framework for constructing instance-adaptive separating menus that match oracle performance without prior knowledge of agent types, linking statistical decision theory with mechanism design.
Findings
Separation menus can elicit private information cost-effectively.
Matching oracle performance is achievable without prior type knowledge.
Numerical examples demonstrate improved error trade-offs.
Abstract
We study hypothesis testing over a heterogeneous population of strategic agents with private information. Any single test applied uniformly across the population yields statistical error that is sub-optimal relative to the performance of an oracle given access to the private information. We show how it is possible to design menus of statistical contracts that pair type-optimal tests with payoff structures, inducing agents to self-select according to their private information. This separating menu elicits agent types and enables the principal to match the oracle performance even without a priori knowledge of the agent type. Our main result fully characterizes the collection of all separating menus that are instance-adaptive, matching oracle performance for an arbitrary population of heterogeneous agents. We identify designs where information elicitation is essentially costless, requiring…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
