Tunable Asymmetric Delay Attack in Quantum Clock Synchronization

TL;DR

This paper introduces a tunable asymmetric delay attack on quantum clock synchronization, demonstrating how dynamic delay control can compromise system stability and highlighting vulnerabilities in current protocols.

Contribution

It presents a novel, dynamically adjustable attack method that exposes specific vulnerabilities in quantum clock synchronization protocols.

Findings

T-ADA can selectively destabilize synchronization systems.

Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the tunable attack.

The work reveals critical security weaknesses in existing quantum synchronization methods.

Abstract

Quantum clock synchronization underpins modern secure communications and critical infrastructure, yet its fundamental dependence on channel reciprocity introduces an exploitable vulnerability to asymmetric delay attacks. Current attack strategies rely on static delays, limiting their ability to target application-specific stability requirements. Here, we propose a tunable asymmetric delay attack (T-ADA) that dynamically controls delay parameters to induce manipulate synchronization accuracy. Through experimental implementation, we demonstrate how tailored attack trajectories can selectively compromise system stability across different scenarios. This work uncovers key vulnerabilities in synchronization protocols under customizable attacks and provide a foundation for developing secure and resilient quantum clock synchronization systems.