Sensing Security in Near-Field ISAC: Exploiting Scatterers for Eavesdropper Deception
Jiangong Chen, Xia Lei, Kaitao Meng, Kawon Han, Yuchen Zhang, Christos Masouros, Athina P. Petropulu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel location deception scheme in near-field ISAC systems that uses scatterers to mislead eavesdroppers, enhancing sensing security without prior eavesdropper information.
Contribution
It proposes a flexible LD approach leveraging known scatterers and advanced optimization techniques to improve security-performance tradeoffs in near-field ISAC.
Findings
The LD scheme effectively confuses eavesdroppers, reducing their detection accuracy.
Simulation results show significant security improvements with adjustable beamforming.
The approach achieves a three-way tradeoff among communication, sensing, and security.
Abstract
In this paper, we explore sensing security in near-field (NF) integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) scenarios by exploiting known scatterers in the sensing scene. We propose a location deception (LD) scheme where scatterers are deliberately illuminated with probing power that is higher than that directed toward targets of interest, with the goal of deceiving potential eavesdroppers (Eves) with sensing capability into misidentifying scatterers as targets. While the known scatterers can be removed at the legitimate sensing receiver, our LD approach causes Eves to misdetect targets. Notably, this deception is achieved without requiring any prior information about the Eves' characteristics or locations. To strike a flexible three-way tradeoff among communication, sensing, and sensing-security performance, the sum rate and power allocated to scatterers are weighted and maximized under…
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