Optimized Distortion in Linear Social Choice
Luise Ge, Gregory Kehne, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

TL;DR
This paper studies how to select candidates optimally when voters' utilities are linear functions of candidate features, providing bounds on distortion and algorithms for minimizing it, with applications in recommendation systems and opinion surveys.
Contribution
It introduces the first analysis of distortion for linear utility functions in social choice, with bounds depending on embedding dimension and new instance-optimal algorithms.
Findings
Bounds on distortion depend only on embedding dimension.
Poly-time algorithms for minimizing distortion are developed.
Empirical evaluation shows improved performance in real-world domains.
Abstract
Social choice theory offers a wealth of approaches for selecting a candidate on behalf of voters based on their reported preference rankings over options. When voters have underlying utilities for these options, however, using preference rankings may lead to suboptimal outcomes vis-\`a-vis utilitarian social welfare. Distortion is a measure of this suboptimality, and provides a worst-case approach for developing and analyzing voting rules when utilities have minimal structure. However in many settings, such as common paradigms for value alignment, alternatives admit a vector representation, and it is natural to suppose that utilities are parametric functions thereof. We undertake the first study of distortion for linear utility functions. Specifically, we investigate the distortion of linear social choice for deterministic and randomized voting rules. We obtain bounds that depend only…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Sentiment Analysis and Opinion Mining
