Social World Model-Augmented Mechanism Design Policy Learning
Xiaoyuan Zhang, Yizhe Huang, Chengdong Ma, Zhixun Chen, Long Ma, Yali Du, Song-Chun Zhu, Yaodong Yang, Xue Feng

TL;DR
This paper introduces SWM-AP, a hierarchical social world model that improves mechanism design in multi-agent systems by inferring agent traits and enhancing policy learning efficiency through simulation and online inference.
Contribution
The paper presents a novel hierarchical social world model that infers agent traits and boosts mechanism design policy learning in complex multi-agent environments.
Findings
SWM-AP outperforms baselines in diverse multi-agent tasks.
Enhanced sample efficiency in mechanism design.
Effective trait inference from interaction trajectories.
Abstract
Designing adaptive mechanisms to align individual and collective interests remains a central challenge in artificial social intelligence. Existing methods often struggle with modeling heterogeneous agents possessing persistent latent traits (e.g., skills, preferences) and dealing with complex multi-agent system dynamics. These challenges are compounded by the critical need for high sample efficiency due to costly real-world interactions. World Models, by learning to predict environmental dynamics, offer a promising pathway to enhance mechanism design in heterogeneous and complex systems. In this paper, we introduce a novel method named SWM-AP (Social World Model-Augmented Mechanism Design Policy Learning), which learns a social world model hierarchically modeling agents' behavior to enhance mechanism design. Specifically, the social world model infers agents' traits from their…
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Taxonomy
TopicsReinforcement Learning in Robotics · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Auction Theory and Applications
