Trace: Securing Smart Contract Repository Against Access Control Vulnerability
Chong Chen, Jiachi Chen, Lingfeng Bao, David Lo, Yanlin Wang, Zhenyu Shan, Ting Chen, Guangqiang Yin, Jianxing Yu, Zibin Zheng

TL;DR
TRACE is a novel tool that leverages large language models to identify access control vulnerabilities in smart contract repositories, even when the code is not directly compilable, outperforming existing methods.
Contribution
The paper introduces TRACE, a new approach using LLMs and graph analysis to detect security flaws in non-compilable smart contract repositories, addressing limitations of prior tools.
Findings
Detects 14 out of 15 CVEs in experiments.
Achieves 89.2% precision on recent on-chain contracts.
Surpasses existing tools in accuracy and scope.
Abstract
Smart contract vulnerabilities, particularly improper Access Control that allows unauthorized execution of restricted functions, have caused billions of dollars in losses. GitHub hosts numerous smart contract repositories containing source code, documentation, and configuration files-these serve as intermediate development artifacts that must be compiled and packaged before deployment. Third-party developers often reference, reuse, or fork code from these repositories during custom development. However, if the referenced code contains vulnerabilities, it can introduce significant security risks. Existing tools for detecting smart contract vulnerabilities are limited in their ability to handle complex repositories, as they typically require the target contract to be compilable to generate an abstract representation for further analysis. This paper presents TRACE, a tool designed to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWeb Application Security Vulnerabilities · Access Control and Trust · Security and Verification in Computing
