Teacher transfers: equalizing deficits across schools
Debasis Mishra, Soumendu Sarkar, Arunava Sen, Jay Sethuraman, Sonal Yadav

TL;DR
This paper models teacher transfers to balance deficits across schools, proposing a strategy-proof algorithm that ensures equitable redistribution aligned with policy goals.
Contribution
It introduces a Lorenz dominance-based transfer model and a strategy-proof algorithm for teacher redistribution across schools.
Findings
Existence of a Lorenz-dominant transfer vector
Development of a two-stage strategy-proof algorithm
Improved equity in teacher distribution
Abstract
The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act (2009) (RTE) of the Government of India prescribes student-teacher ratios for state-run schools. One method advocated by the Act to achieve its goals is the redeployment of teachers from surplus to deficit (in teacher strength) schools. We consider a model where teachers can either remain in their initially assigned schools or be transferred to a deficit school in their acceptable set. The planner's objective is specified in terms of the post-transfer deficit vector that can be achieved. We show that there exists a transfer whose post-transfer deficit vector Lorenz dominates all achievable post-transfer deficit vectors. We provide a two-stage algorithm to derive the Lorenz-dominant post-transfer deficit vector, and show that this algorithm is strategy-proof for teachers.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSchool Choice and Performance · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare · Game Theory and Voting Systems
