Incomplete yet existent objects: a Nuclear Meinongian approach to quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

TL;DR

This paper examines quantum metaphysical indeterminacy through Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism, identifies a key incompatibility with quantum mechanics, and proposes dropping a principle that leads to nonexistence of quantum objects.

Contribution

It introduces a novel interpretation of quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness within a Meinongian framework and addresses a fundamental incompatibility with standard quantum mechanics.

Findings

Identifies a conflict between Parsons' theory and quantum mechanics.

Proposes dropping the Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle.

Discusses implications for quantum object metaphysics.

Abstract

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons' Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons' theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons' framework, leads to what we term the ``Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle'' (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.