The Walras-Bowley Lecture: Fragmentation of Matching Markets and How Economics Can Help Integrate Them
Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima, Akira Matsushita

TL;DR
This paper examines how fragmentation affects matching markets like school choice and medical residencies, using Japanese daycare data to evaluate partial versus full market integration and their impacts on welfare and efficiency.
Contribution
It provides empirical evidence on the effects of market fragmentation and proposes a balanced partial integration approach to improve outcomes.
Findings
Partial integration recovers 39.2% to 59.6% of welfare gains of full integration.
Partial integration reduces travel time by 3.3% to 4.9%.
Unmatch rate decreases by 40% to 52.8% under partial integration.
Abstract
Fragmentation of matching markets is a ubiquitous problem across countries and across applications. In order to study the implications of fragmentation and possibilities for integration, we first document and discuss a variety of fragmentation cases in practice such as school choice, medical residency matching, and so forth. Using the real-life dataset of daycare matching markets in Japan, we then empirically evaluate the impact of interregional transfer of students by estimating student utility functions under a variety of specifications and then using them for counterfactual simulation. Our simulation compares a fully integrated market and a partially integrated one with a "balancedness" constraint -- for each region, the inflow of students from the other regions must be equal to the outflow to the other areas. We find that partial integration achieves 39.2 to 59.6% of the increase in…
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