Does Extending Polling Hours Compensate for Bomb Threats? Evidence from the 2024 Election in Georgia, USA

TL;DR

This study examines whether extending polling hours in Georgia during the 2024 election mitigated the impact of bomb threats on voter turnout, revealing mixed effectiveness of the remedy across counties.

Contribution

It provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of extending polling hours as a response to bomb threats during an election.

Findings

In DeKalb, polling extensions did not fully compensate for turnout suppression.

In Fulton, no significant turnout suppression was observed.

Bomb threats had a measurable impact on voter turnout in some counties.

Abstract

At least 227~bomb threats against polling places and tabulation centers were received on the day of the 2024 US presidential election. Threats disrupted voting in the swing states of Georgia, Arizona, and Pennsylvania while law enforcement swept polling places. No bombs were found. Roughly a dozen `credible' threats were received in Georgia in DeKalb and Fulton counties, interrupting voting at eleven polling locations; there were dozens of `non-credible' threats in addition. To remediate the effect of the temporary closures of polling places, courts ordered some polling places to remain open late. Nonparametric statistical tests using turnout data from 2020 and 2024 show that this remedy may have been inadequate: in DeKalb, 2024 in-person turnout in precincts closed by threats relative to 2020 turnout in the same precincts was suppressed compared to other DeKalb polling places ($P \approx 0.01$). In Fulton, there is no statistical evidence that in-person voting was suppressed in precincts closed by bomb threats.