Aggregate Fictitious Play for Learning in Anonymous Polymatrix Games (Extended Version)
Semih Kara, Tamer Ba\c{s}ar

TL;DR
This paper introduces aggregate fictitious play (agg-FP), a novel algorithm for learning Nash equilibria in anonymous polymatrix games, which reduces the action space and accelerates convergence while maintaining theoretical guarantees.
Contribution
The paper proposes agg-FP, a new variant of fictitious play that leverages anonymous game structure to improve learning efficiency and convergence speed.
Findings
agg-FP converges to Nash equilibrium in anonymous polymatrix games.
Aggregation reduces the action space, leading to faster convergence.
Simulations demonstrate empirical acceleration of learning.
Abstract
Fictitious play (FP) is a well-studied algorithm that enables agents to learn Nash equilibrium in games with certain reward structures. However, when agents have no prior knowledge of the reward functions, FP faces a major challenge: the joint action space grows exponentially with the number of agents, which slows down reward exploration. Anonymous games offer a structure that mitigates this issue. In these games, the rewards depend only on the actions taken; not on who is taking which action. Under such a structure, we introduce aggregate fictitious play (agg-FP), a variant of FP where each agent tracks the frequency of the number of other agents playing each action, rather than these agents' individual actions. We show that in anonymous polymatrix games, agg-FP converges to a Nash equilibrium under the same conditions as classical FP. In essence, by aggregating the agents' actions, we…
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