The Double-edged Sword of LLM-based Data Reconstruction: Understanding and Mitigating Contextual Vulnerability in Word-level Differential Privacy Text Sanitization
Stephen Meisenbacher, Alexandra Klymenko, Andreea-Elena Bodea, and Florian Matthes

TL;DR
This paper investigates how Large Language Models can exploit the contextual vulnerabilities in word-level differential privacy text sanitization, revealing both risks and potential benefits for privacy and utility.
Contribution
It expands on previous work by testing various sanitization mechanisms and demonstrates the dual role of LLMs in both attacking and enhancing privacy in DP text sanitization.
Findings
LLMs can infer original semantics from sanitized texts.
LLMs can degrade privacy protections but also improve text utility.
Adversarial use of LLMs can enhance privacy post-processing.
Abstract
Differentially private text sanitization refers to the process of privatizing texts under the framework of Differential Privacy (DP), providing provable privacy guarantees while also empirically defending against adversaries seeking to harm privacy. Despite their simplicity, DP text sanitization methods operating at the word level exhibit a number of shortcomings, among them the tendency to leave contextual clues from the original texts due to randomization during sanitization this we refer to as . Given the powerful contextual understanding and inference capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), we explore to what extent LLMs can be leveraged to exploit the contextual vulnerability of DP-sanitized texts. We expand on previous work not only in the use of advanced LLMs, but also in testing a broader range of sanitization mechanisms…
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