Consistent Opponent Modeling in Imperfect-Information Games
Sam Ganzfried

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new opponent modeling algorithm for imperfect-information games that guarantees convergence to the true opponent strategy using a convex optimization approach, outperforming existing methods.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel, efficient opponent modeling algorithm that guarantees convergence to the true opponent strategy in imperfect-information games, unlike prior approaches.
Findings
The new algorithm guarantees convergence to the true opponent strategy.
It efficiently solves a convex minimization problem using projected gradient descent.
The approach outperforms existing opponent modeling methods in imperfect-information settings.
Abstract
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some settings; however, such approaches fail to capitalize on historical and observed data from repeated interactions against our opponents. Opponent modeling algorithms integrate machine learning techniques to exploit suboptimal opponents utilizing available data; however, the effectiveness of such approaches in imperfect-information games to date is quite limited. We show that existing opponent modeling approaches fail to satisfy a simple desirable property even against static opponents drawn from a known prior distribution; namely, they do not guarantee that the model approaches the opponent's true strategy even in the limit as the number of game iterations…
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