ZAPS: A Zero-Knowledge Proof Protocol for Secure UAV Authentication with Flight Path Privacy
Shayesta Naziri, Xu Wang, Guangsheng Yu, Christy Jie Liang, and Wei Ni

TL;DR
This paper introduces a zk-SNARK-based protocol enabling UAVs to authenticate and verify flight paths securely without revealing sensitive trajectory data, thus enhancing privacy and security in adversarial environments.
Contribution
It presents a novel privacy-preserving flight path authentication framework using zero-knowledge proofs for UAVs, balancing security, privacy, and efficiency.
Findings
Ensures UAVs can prove authorization without revealing paths
Reduces risk of tracking and surveillance attacks
Maintains computational efficiency suitable for resource-constrained UAVs
Abstract
The increasing deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for military, commercial, and logistics applications has raised significant concerns regarding flight path privacy. Conventional UAV communication systems often expose flight path data to third parties, making them vulnerable to tracking, surveillance, and location inference attacks. Existing encryption techniques provide security but fail to ensure complete privacy, as adversaries can still infer movement patterns through metadata analysis. To address these challenges, we propose a zk-SNARK(Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge)-based privacy-preserving flight path authentication and verification framework. Our approach ensures that a UAV can prove its authorisation, validate its flight path with a control centre, and comply with regulatory constraints without revealing any sensitive trajectory…
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