Intersubjective Agreement about Quantum States Is Unnecessary in QBism
Gino Elia, Jennifer Carter, and Robert Crease

TL;DR
This paper argues that intersubjective agreement on quantum states is unnecessary in QBism, emphasizing reciprocity among observers and the phenomenological nature of state assignments, thus challenging traditional notions of objectivity.
Contribution
It defends QBism's view that mutual agreement on quantum states isn't required, introducing a reciprocity concept and phenomenological perspective to clarify objectification.
Findings
Intersubjective agreement on quantum states is unnecessary.
Reciprocity among observers replaces the need for agreement.
Quantum state assignments are thematizations of phenomena.
Abstract
The thought experiment called Wigner's Friend has experienced a renewal of interest for interrogating the meaning of intersubjectivity and objectivity in quantum mechanics. These new inquiries extend to investigations at the intersection of phenomenology and QBism. Philosopher of physics Steven French has criticized QBism on the grounds that it does not give assurances that Wigner and friend must agree on the same quantum state or the same set of facts in the experiment. In this paper, we draw on Wigner's Friend to argue that intersubjective agreement on quantum states is unnecessary. We defend the QBist notion of reciprocity, treating Wigner and friend as "peer observers" or physical systems taking mutual actions on each other. We argue that accounts of intersubjectivity that preserve the possibility of privileged observation, vantage points for solipsistic super-observers, undermine…
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