Detectability of Covert Fissile Material Production in Nuclear Fusion Reactors via Antineutrino Emissions

TL;DR

This paper investigates whether antineutrino detectors can covertly monitor fissile material production in fusion reactors, demonstrating that small detectors can detect production of a few kilograms of plutonium within a month.

Contribution

It introduces a method to detect covert fissile material production in fusion reactors using antineutrino emissions, enhancing nuclear non-proliferation monitoring capabilities.

Findings

Small antineutrino detectors can detect production of a few kilograms of plutonium.

Detection is feasible over 30 days despite background noise.

Antineutrino emissions from neutron activation can be distinguished.

Abstract

Fusion power systems can in principle be used to make significant amounts of fissile material. To do so, an operator would have to introduce fertile material, such as uranium-238, in a suitable region of the reactor where it is exposed to an intense neutron flux. The possibility of using a fusion reactor for this purpose has raised the question of how these facilities can be monitored to ensure their peaceful use. This study examines whether covert production of fissile material in a declared fusion plant could be detected with an onsite antineutrino detector. We find that even a relatively small detector should be able to confirm production rates of a few kilograms of plutonium over 30 days, despite the cosmogenic background and the antineutrino emissions associated with neutron activation of reactor components.