A Social Choice Analysis of Optimism's Retroactive Project Funding
Eyal Briman, Nimrod Talmon, Angela Kreitenweis, Muhammad Idrees

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the governance of Optimism's retroactive project funding, identifies shortcomings, and proposes a computational social choice mechanism to improve decision-making and social welfare in decentralized DAO funding.
Contribution
It introduces a formal framework applying the utilitarian moving phantoms mechanism to enhance DAO governance and funding allocation processes.
Findings
Identifies governance shortcomings in current RetroPGF system
Proposes adoption of a strategyproof, welfare-enhancing voting mechanism
Provides a formal model for improved decentralized funding mechanisms
Abstract
The Optimism Retroactive Project Funding (RetroPGF) is a key initiative within the blockchain ecosystem that retroactively rewards projects deemed valuable to the Ethereum and Optimism communities. Managed by the Optimism Collective, a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), RetroPGF represents a large-scale experiment in decentralized governance. Funding rewards are distributed in OP tokens, the native digital currency of the ecosystem. As of this writing, four funding rounds have been completed, collectively allocating over 100M dollars, with an additional 1.3B dollars reserved for future rounds. However, we identify significant shortcomings in the current allocation system, underscoring the need for improved governance mechanisms given the scale of funds involved. Leveraging computational social choice techniques and insights from multiagent systems, we propose improvements to…
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