Explainable Information Design
Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

TL;DR
This paper introduces explainable information design with simple, monotone partitions of the state space, analyzing the trade-offs in performance compared to optimal schemes and providing computational methods for implementation.
Contribution
It establishes the price of explainability in linear information design, extending analysis to multi-dimensional states, and offers efficient approximation algorithms despite NP-hardness.
Findings
Price of explainability is exactly 1/2 in the worst case.
For uniform prior, the PoE improves to 2/3.
Efficient approximation algorithms are provided for optimizing explainable policies.
Abstract
Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audited or communicated. We propose explainable information design in the context of linear information design with a continuous state space. In the case of single-dimensional state, we restrict the information designer to use -partitional signaling schemes defined by deterministic and monotone partitions of the state space, where a unique signal is sent for all states in each part. We prove that the price of explainability (PoE) -- the ratio between the performances of the optimal explainable signaling scheme and unrestricted signaling scheme -- is exactly in the worst case, meaning that partitional signaling schemes are never worse than arbitrary signaling schemes by a factor of . For a uniform…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSemantic Web and Ontologies
