Red Teaming Methodology for Design Obfuscation
Yuntao Liu, Abir Akib, Zelin Lu, Qian Xu, Ankur Srivastava, Gang Qu, David Kehlet, Nij Dorairaj

TL;DR
This paper introduces a systematic red teaming methodology to evaluate the security of design obfuscation techniques in VLSI, revealing potential information leaks and providing metrics for assessing obfuscation robustness.
Contribution
It proposes a new evaluation framework and security metrics for design obfuscation, including a case study demonstrating vulnerabilities in existing tools.
Findings
RIPPER tool leaks more design structure information than previously thought
The proposed methodology effectively identifies security weaknesses in obfuscation schemes
Security metrics help quantify the resilience of obfuscation methods
Abstract
The main goal of design obfuscation schemes is to protect sensitive design details from untrusted parties in the VLSI supply chain, including but not limited to off-shore foundries and untrusted end users. In this work, we provide a systematic red teaming approach to evaluate the security of design obfuscation approaches. Specifically, we propose security metrics and evaluation methodology for the scenarios where the adversary does not have access to a working chip. A case study on the RIPPER tool developed by the University of Florida indicates that more information is leaked about the structure of the original design than commonly considered.
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