TL;DR
This paper explores fairness in allocating indivisible goods with complex valuation functions, extending PROP1 fairness beyond additive valuations and providing algorithms for various valuation classes.
Contribution
It demonstrates that PROP1 fairness can be achieved and computed efficiently for non-additive valuations, including submodular and subadditive cases, under satiating goods.
Findings
EF1 implies PROP1 for submodular valuations
Round-robin achieves partial PROP1 for satiating goods
Maximum Nash welfare allocations are PROP1 for monotone submodular goods
Abstract
Although approximate notions of envy-freeness-such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)-have been extensively studied for indivisible goods, the seemingly simpler fairness concept of proportionality up to one good (PROP1) has received far less attention. For additive valuations, every EF1 allocation is PROP1, and well-known algorithms such as Round-Robin and Envy-Cycle Elimination compute such allocations in polynomial time. PROP1 is also compatible with Pareto efficiency, as maximum Nash welfare allocations are EF1 and hence PROP1. We ask whether these favorable properties extend to non-additive valuations. We study a broad class of allocation instances with {\em satiating goods}, where agents have non-negative valuation functions that need not be monotone, allowing for negative marginal values. We present the following results: - EF1 implies PROP1 for submodular valuations over…
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