Active inference for action-unaware agents
Filippo Torresan, Keisuke Suzuki, Ryota Kanai, Manuel Baltieri

TL;DR
This paper compares action-aware and action-unaware agents within the active inference framework, demonstrating that action-unaware agents can perform comparably in navigation tasks despite lacking explicit action knowledge.
Contribution
It introduces a comparison between action-aware and action-unaware active inference agents, highlighting the capabilities of the latter in navigation tasks.
Findings
Action-unaware agents achieve performance similar to action-aware agents.
Action-unaware agents operate without explicit knowledge of their actions.
Both types of agents can effectively navigate environments.
Abstract
Active inference is a formal approach to study cognition based on the notion that adaptive agents can be seen as engaging in a process of approximate Bayesian inference, via the minimisation of variational and expected free energies. Minimising the former provides an account of perceptual processes and learning as evidence accumulation, while minimising the latter describes how agents select their actions over time. In this way, adaptive agents are able to maximise the likelihood of preferred observations or states, given a generative model of the environment. In the literature, however, different strategies have been proposed to describe how agents can plan their future actions. While they all share the notion that some kind of expected free energy offers an appropriate way to score policies, sequences of actions, in terms of their desirability, there are different ways to consider the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Semantic Web and Ontologies · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms
