Pruning and Malicious Injection: A Retraining-Free Backdoor Attack on Transformer Models
Taibiao Zhao, Mingxuan Sun, Hao Wang, Xiaobing Chen, Xiangwei Zhou

TL;DR
This paper introduces HPMI, a retraining-free backdoor attack on transformer models that prunes and injects malicious heads, achieving high success rates and robustness without altering architecture or retraining.
Contribution
HPMI is a novel backdoor attack method that does not require retraining or architecture modification, using pruning and malicious head injection to evade detection.
Findings
Achieves over 99.55% attack success rate
Maintains negligible impact on clean accuracy
Successfully bypasses multiple defense mechanisms
Abstract
Transformer models have demonstrated exceptional performance and have become indispensable in computer vision (CV) and natural language processing (NLP) tasks. However, recent studies reveal that transformers are susceptible to backdoor attacks. Prior backdoor attack methods typically rely on retraining with clean data or altering the model architecture, both of which can be resource-intensive and intrusive. In this paper, we propose Head-wise Pruning and Malicious Injection (HPMI), a novel retraining-free backdoor attack on transformers that does not alter the model's architecture. Our approach requires only a small subset of the original data and basic knowledge of the model architecture, eliminating the need for retraining the target transformer. Technically, HPMI works by pruning the least important head and injecting a pre-trained malicious head to establish the backdoor. We…
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