The impact of the European Union's enlargement with the Western Balkans and the Association Trio on the power of member states in the Council

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how EU enlargement with Western Balkans and the Association Trio affects member states' power using game theory indices, revealing power shifts and paradoxes in different scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a detailed analysis of member state power dynamics during EU enlargement, highlighting differences between Banzhaf and Shapley--Shubik indices and the impact of new member coalitions.

Findings

Smaller member states gain power with Western Balkan accession.

In a 36-member EU, all current members lose some power post-enlargement.

Some coalitions benefit more from the EU36 enlargement than from a smaller EU33.

Abstract

As of 2022, the European Union has taken several steps regarding enlargement. We focus on the accession of countries with which the Union is actively negotiating membership. This is examined under two enlargement scenarios: first, the enlargement along the lines of the Western Balkan countries, and second, the accession of a trio (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) to the already enlarged Union. We determine the a priori power of the member states based on the Banzhaf and Shapley--Shubik indices. Various coalitions are also assumed to assess the power and influence of member states, considering both pre- and post-enlargement scenarios. We found a rare case when the two indices give different rankings. In the case of the Western Balkan countries' accession, the smaller population member states gain power, presenting an example of the new member paradox. While in a Union of 36 members, every member state loses some of their current power. However, some coalitions are better off with the EU36 enlargement than a EU33 one.