AI Agents and the Law

TL;DR

This paper explores how AI agents intersect with legal concepts, highlighting gaps in current AI theory regarding loyalty and third-party interactions, and proposes a path for responsible development.

Contribution

It identifies gaps in AI agent theory related to legal notions of loyalty and third-party interactions, offering insights for responsible AI deployment.

Findings

Correlation between implied authority and value-alignment in AI

Gaps in AI theory regarding disclosure and loyalty

Potential unintended effects in AI ecommerce agents

Abstract

As AI becomes more "agentic," it faces technical and socio-legal issues it must address if it is to fulfill its promise of increased economic productivity and efficiency. This paper uses technical and legal perspectives to explain how things change when AI systems start being able to directly execute tasks on behalf of a user. We show how technical conceptions of agents track some, but not all, socio-legal conceptions of agency. That is, both computer science and the law recognize the problems of under-specification for an agent, and both disciplines have robust conceptions of how to address ensuring an agent does what the programmer, or in the law, the principal desires and no more. However, to date, computer science has under-theorized issues related to questions of loyalty and to third parties that interact with an agent, both of which are central parts of the law of agency. First, we examine the correlations between implied authority in agency law and the principle of value-alignment in AI, wherein AI systems must operate under imperfect objective specification. Second, we reveal gaps in the current computer science view of agents pertaining to the legal concepts of disclosure and loyalty, and how failure to account for them can result in unintended effects in AI ecommerce agents. In surfacing these gaps, we show a path forward for responsible AI agent development and deployment.