Voltage Support Procurement in Transmission Grids: Incentive Design via Online Bilevel Games

TL;DR

This paper proposes an online incentive design framework using bilevel game theory and feedback optimization to improve voltage support in transmission grids with distributed energy resources.

Contribution

It introduces a real-time, feedback-based incentive mechanism modeled as a Stackelberg game for reactive power procurement.

Findings

Effective voltage regulation achieved in simulations

Robustness against model uncertainties demonstrated

Facilitates strategic interaction management among DSOs

Abstract

The integration of distributed energy resources into transmission grid operations presents a complex challenge, particularly in the context of reactive power procurement for voltage support. This paper addresses this challenge by formulating the voltage regulation problem as a Stackelberg game, where the Transmission System Operator (TSO) designs incentives to guide the reactive power responses of Distribution System Operators (DSOs). We utilize a gradient-based iterative algorithm that updates the incentives to ensure that DSOs adjust their reactive power injections to maintain voltage stability. We incorporate principles from online feedback optimization to enable real-time implementation, utilizing voltage measurements in both TSO's and DSOs' policies. This approach not only enhances the robustness against model uncertainties and changing operating conditions but also facilitates the co-design of incentives and automation. Numerical experiments on a 5-bus transmission grid demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in achieving voltage regulation while accommodating the strategic interactions of self-interested DSOs.