Eavesdropping Risk in Terahertz Channels by Covered Wavy Surfaces

TL;DR

This paper investigates how covering metallic wavy surfaces in terahertz channels affects eavesdropping risks, revealing persistent vulnerabilities that are not mitigated by common concealment materials, highlighting the need for improved security measures.

Contribution

It provides the first detailed analysis of security vulnerabilities in terahertz channels with covered reflective surfaces, demonstrating that concealment does not eliminate eavesdropping threats.

Findings

Covering materials redistribute eavesdropping threats rather than eliminate them.

Feasible interception scenarios remain undetectable through conventional backscattering monitoring.

Enhanced security mechanisms are necessary for covered reflecting elements.

Abstract

Terahertz communications offer unprecedented data rates for next-generation wireless networks but suffer blockage susceptibility that restrict coverage and introduce physical-layer security vulnerabilities. Non-line-of-sight relay schemes using metallic wavy surfaces (MWS) address coverage limitations but require concealment beneath indoor materials for practical deployment. This work investigates THz channel characteristics and security vulnerabilities when MWS surfaces are covered with wallpaper, curtain, and wall plaster across 113-170 GHz. Results reveal that covering materials redistribute rather than eliminate eavesdropping threats, with persistent feasible interception scenarios remaining undetectable through conventional backscattering monitoring. These findings underscore the need for enhanced mechanisms designed for covered reflecting elements.