Privacy Risks of LLM-Empowered Recommender Systems: An Inversion Attack Perspective
Yubo Wang, Min Tang, Nuo Shen, Shujie Cui, Weiqing Wang

TL;DR
This paper reveals that LLM-powered recommender systems are vulnerable to inversion attacks that can reconstruct user preferences and demographic data, exposing significant privacy risks.
Contribution
It presents the first systematic study of inversion attacks on LLM-based recommenders and proposes a novel refinement method for more accurate prompt reconstruction.
Findings
Achieves 65% item recovery rate
Correctly infers age and gender in 87% of cases
Privacy leakage depends on domain and prompt complexity
Abstract
The large language model (LLM) powered recommendation paradigm has been proposed to address the limitations of traditional recommender systems, which often struggle to handle cold start users or items with new IDs. Despite its effectiveness, this study uncovers that LLM empowered recommender systems are vulnerable to reconstruction attacks that can expose both system and user privacy. To examine this threat, we present the first systematic study on inversion attacks targeting LLM empowered recommender systems, where adversaries attempt to reconstruct original prompts that contain personal preferences, interaction histories, and demographic attributes by exploiting the output logits of recommendation models. We reproduce the vec2text framework and optimize it using our proposed method called Similarity Guided Refinement, enabling more accurate reconstruction of textual prompts from model…
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