Toward a Graph-Theoretic Model of Belief: Confidence, Credibility, and Structural Coherence

TL;DR

This paper proposes a graph-based formalism for modeling belief systems that captures internal structure, credibility, and confidence without relying on probabilistic or logical inference, enabling analysis of epistemic coherence and tensions.

Contribution

It introduces a novel graph-theoretic model of beliefs that separates structure from belief strength, allowing detailed analysis of internal coherence and epistemic states.

Findings

Provides a static, structural framework for beliefs

Enables analysis of coherence and epistemic tensions

Distinguishes belief structure from confidence and credibility

Abstract

Belief systems are often treated as globally consistent sets of propositions or as scalar-valued probability distributions. Such representations tend to obscure the internal structure of belief, conflate external credibility with internal coherence, and preclude the modeling of fragmented or contradictory epistemic states. This paper introduces a minimal formalism for belief systems as directed, weighted graphs. In this framework, nodes represent individual beliefs, edges encode epistemic relationships (e.g., support or contradiction), and two distinct functions assign each belief a credibility (reflecting source trust) and a confidence (derived from internal structural support). Unlike classical probabilistic models, our approach does not assume prior coherence or require belief updating. Unlike logical and argumentation-based frameworks, it supports fine-grained structural representation without committing to binary justification status or deductive closure. The model is purely static and deliberately excludes inference or revision procedures. Its aim is to provide a foundational substrate for analyzing the internal organization of belief systems, including coherence conditions, epistemic tensions, and representational limits. By distinguishing belief structure from belief strength, this formalism enables a richer classification of epistemic states than existing probabilistic, logical, or argumentation-based approaches.