Real-World Evaluation of Protocol-Compliant Denial-of-Service Attacks on C-V2X-based Forward Collision Warning Systems
Jean Michel Tine, Mohammed Aldeen, Abyad Enan, M Sabbir Salek, Long Cheng, Mashrur Chowdhury

TL;DR
This study evaluates real-world protocol-compliant DoS attacks on C-V2X safety systems, revealing significant degradation in performance despite adherence to standards.
Contribution
It demonstrates that standard-compliant UDP flooding and oversized BSM attacks can severely impair C-V2X safety communications in real-world scenarios.
Findings
UDP flooding reduces packet delivery by up to 87%
Oversized BSMs overload receiver resources causing delays
Combined attacks cause near-total communication failure
Abstract
Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technology enables low-latency, reliable communications essential for safety applications such as a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) system. C-V2X deployments operate under strict protocol compliance with the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the Society of Automotive Engineers Standard (SAE) J2735 specifications to ensure interoperability. This paper presents a real-world testbed evaluation of protocol-compliant Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks using User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding and oversized Basic Safety Message (BSM) attacks that 7 exploit transport- and application-layer vulnerabilities in C-V2X. The attacks presented in this study transmit valid messages over standard PC5 sidelinks, fully adhering to 3GPP and SAE J2735 specifications, but at abnormally high rates and with oversized payloads that overload the receiver…
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