Collective contributions to polarization in political voting
Edward D. Lee

TL;DR
This paper extends a statistical physics model to analyze complex, multi-dimensional voting behavior, revealing that polarization involves both polarized and non-polarized coalitions, driven mainly by fewer bipartisan votes.
Contribution
It introduces a minimal, interpretable model based on restricted Boltzmann machines to explain multi-dimensional voting preferences and collective contributions to polarization.
Findings
Senators have multi-dimensional preferences.
Non-polarized coalitions coexist with polarized ones.
Polarization increases mainly due to fewer bipartisan votes.
Abstract
Politics around the world exhibits increasing polarization, demonstrated in part by rigid voting configurations in institutions like legislatures or courts. A crux of polarization is separation along a unidimensional ideological axis, but voting behavior is in reality more complex, with other signatures of collective order. We extend a foundational, statistical physics framework, restricted Boltzmann machines, to explain the full complexity of voting. The models we propose are minimal, fit strongly correlated voting data, and have parameters that transparently give vote probabilities. The model accounts for multi-dimensional voter preferences and the context in which such preferences are expressed to disentangle individual from collective contributions; for example, legislative bills can negotiate multiple issues, whose appeals add up or compete for individual votes. With the example of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Statistical Mechanics and Entropy
